This volume has three main aims. The first aim is to explore interconnections between metaphysical questions about the nature of selfhood and ethical questions concerning the practical implications of revising or subverting various traditional conceptions of selfhood and personhood. Another aim, much more general but equally important, is to raise problems and new prospects for both comparative philosophy and cross-cultural philosophy. The focus on Buddhist philosophy, in particular, highlights a third aim of our project: to throw light on the ways in which Buddhist philosophy in particular has either anticipated, echoed or contributed to seminal episodes in the history of Western philosophy. Many of the chapters here focus on philosophical ideas without belabouring historical details (though the first offers an overview of the historical connections that link the history of Buddhist philosophy – at certain points – with the history of Western philosophy). Several of vi our chapters engage in doing Buddhist philosophy; but at the same time, these chapters directly or indirectly highlight the potential for treating the Buddhist tradition as an element in a comparative case study. We raise, albeit tentatively in some cases, the questions of whether, and why, two independent traditions of philosophy would end up tackling similar philosophical problems, not to mention tackling what might be the same meta-problem – namely, of how the metaphysical problems and the ethical problems do or should relate to each other.